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Part Eleven
"In Operation Crusader can be discerned most of the major themes of the rest of the desert war : first, that Rommel's options were terribly constrained by logistical difficulties: second, that the Commonwealth forces were much more generously and regularly supplied and could therefore field vastly superior numbers of men and equipment; third, that this superiority was wielded with a remarkable lack of operational and tactical flair, such that the Commonwealth victories were largely attritional, gained by stubbornly trading off hardware until Rommel's holdings were virtually non-existent; fourth, that even when Axis forces were reduced to pitiful remnants, British generalship remained unequal to the task of actually finishing them off." John Ellis — Brute Force (p. 250)
"The Desert is a tactician's paradise and a quartermaster's hell." Rommel
Last month we looked at some of the deception measures carried out during Operation Crusader and discussed Jasper Maskelyne's possible role in this operation. Although, it was not clear how effective the measures were, the British attack certainly took Rommel by surprise. He was actually away in Rome at the time. Furthermore, Ultra intelligence was aware of Rommel's absence. After initial gains, the Crusader offensive faltered and Rommel hit back with daring tactical manoeuvres. Handicapped by the kind of constraints outlined in the opening quote to this article (short of fuel and supplies and significantly outnumbered in tanks and soldiers), Rommel was unable to achieve his desired objectives and reluctantly withdrew. This prolonged clash was difficult and uncertain for both sides. An important point to note is that the shifting course of the Desert War over this particular period had little to do with the peripheral and puny machinations of deception and camouflage experts. Even Fisher portrays Maskelyne at this stage of the campaign as feeling like a conjuror with immense potential playing to an empty theatre, a frustrated non-combatant on the sidelines, likely to be viewed merely as " a bizarre footnote to history: a magician playing at war". In the short space available it is not possible to do justice to the intricacies of the see-sawing war in North Africa. However, I have attached a brief chronology to this website which might be of benefit to interested but perhaps slightly confused readers. This framework will eventually need to be expanded so as to include not only key episodes in the deception war but also the probable dates of Maskelyne's own activities. A useful introduction to the changing fortunes of the Desert War is Episode Eight of the documentary series the World at War. Desert - The War in North Africa, narrated by the late Laurence Olivier, captures the sweeping reversals experienced by both sides. It covers the early forays of Mussolini in 1940, his embarrassing defeat , Rommel's emergence and near triumph, and the British recovery, culminating in the decisive battle of El Alamein.
ROMMEL'S OWN DECEPTION OPERATIONS
The opinion expressed by the author of "Magic Top-Secret" that Germany did not resort to military deception is quite mistaken. Deception measures were used extensively by both sides. Presumably, immediately after the war, the extent of the German deception and camouflage schemes were not fully known or appreciated by outsiders. I have drawn together some interesting examples of ruses allegedly exploited by Rommel. Schmidt, in his memoirs, "With Rommel in the Desert(1951)", claims that soon after his arrival in Tripoli Rommel staged an impressive military parade : "Singly and at regular intervals the Panzers clattered and rattled by...Not far past the saluting base the column turned into a side-street with mighty squeaks and creaks. I began to wonder at the extraordinary number of Panzers passing...After quarter of an hour I noticed a fault in one of the chains of a heavy Mark IV Panzer, which somehow looked familiar to me..." According to Schmidt, Rommel had arranged for each tank secretly to circle back and rejoin the parade, thus bolstering the numbers on display for the benefit of enemy spys. (I couldn't help but think of the BBC's early episodes of Dr.Who where the same three or four Daleks circle past the static camera giving the impression to the viewer of vast numbers.) In the World at War documentary, Hans Otto Behrendt, who served in the Afrika Korps, recalls, in rather strained English, the following humorous anecdote: "In the port of Tripoli in February/March '41, Rommel told my friend Lieutenant Hunt, an engineer, "Hunt, here you can build me 150 tanks". The man looked stupefied . And Rommel told him : "don't you have timber here in the harbour and canvas of sails to make 150 covers for Volkswagen ? ... so you can give me 150 tanks..." And those tanks misled the British." Fisher also makes a mention of similar mobile dummies: "Maskelyne knew that Rommel had mounted his dummy tanks on Volkswagen chassis so that they could scoot about the desert under their own power." Fisher claims that the Magic Gang, in turn, built 26 mobile dummy tanks from discarded jeeps and cars. There is an excellent anecdote recorded in the Desert Fox's latest biography, Knight's Cross (1993)by David Fraser. In the confused aftermath to Crusader , Rommel was busy extricating his men and equipment from pursuing enemy forces : " He saw one of his surviving 88s exposed to British long-range artillery fire in a poorly selected covering position during the withdrawal, and drove up angrily to rebuke the commander, only to find that the gun was a dummy, an Italian telegraph pole skilfully camouflaged. Rommel grinned. "Take it with you!" he said. "We don't want the enemy to find out all our tricks before we improve on them." In early 1942, having survived Crusader, Rommel was keen to regain the initiative. Contrary to appearances, he was far from finished. Fisher notes that Rommel deliberately gave the impression he was withdrawing from Libya: "To bait his trap, he torched dozens of buildings in the city of Mersa Brega and scuttled numerous supply ships in the harbour...The 'strongholds' burned for the benefit of British agents in the city were actually abandoned houses, the ships useless hulks." In reality, he had no intention of leaving Africa. Controversial war historian, David Irving, also refers to this ruse in his own biography of Rommel, "The Trail of the Fox": "He forbade all truck movements towards the enemy by day - on the contrary, he ostentatiously ran truck convoys westwards until dusk, then switched them under cover of darkness towards the enemy. The tanks and the guns were expertly camouflaged."... " the skies lit up with the fires of buildings and ships along the coast, deliberately ignited by Rommel to suggest that a major Axis retreat had begun." There is some evidence that the movement of trucks in the opposite direction , to the west, during the daytime did fool the British. "On 20 January...the local Senussi informed the British forward troops that the enemy were preparing to withdraw further west." (Hinsley, British Intelligence in W.W.2 p.199) On the 21st of January, 1942, Rommel dramatically launched a major surprise offensive. Historian Lewin confirms Rommel's desire for secrecy :"Intense security was imposed - night moves, tanks camouflaged as lorries*, no intimation of intentions either to the Italians or - more daringly - OKW" ( The Life and Death of the Afrika Korps, p. 120). * a variant perhaps of the sunshield ruse developed by the British ? Ironically, the intelligence gleaned from Ultra on this particular occasion backfired. The British were intercepting genuine messages from the German High Command instructing Rommel to stay put, but Rommel decided to ignore this advice. It was now his turn to catch the British unprepared and overstretched... The main events in this offensive can be found in the attached chronology. ___________________________________________________________________________ During this period, Malta , with its port and three airfields, was a vital island base for British forces trying to cut off Rommel's supplies. The Germans decided that the aerial bombardment of Malta had to be intensified. As stated by Fisher, Maskelyne was sent to Malta (in c. February 1942 ) to provide camouflage advice. In a previous article (Part Seven), I questioned the authenticity of a particular incident recorded in "Magic Top-Secret " : the enemy bomber flown by escaping P.O.W.'s. Nevertheless, it is quite possible that Maskelyne did at some stage visit Malta. According to Fisher's account, the camoufleurs copied and developed Turner's ideas intro-duced during the Battle of Britain. Decoy airfields, together with fake rubble and simulated craters , were prepared. Dummy aircraft were built and positioned accordingly. Fisher makes the interesting point that even after German reconnaissance had spotted the decoys, the camoufleurs cunningly began mixing dummy aircraft with real aircraft to confuse and double-bluff the enemy. ___________________________________________________________________________ On May 26th, 1942 , Rommel , again ignoring orders , commenced Operation Theseus. A successful German deception plan was implemented in order to give the impression that the main attack would be to the north. In fact, the important thrust came from the south and the British were skilfully outflanked. As the operation progressed, Rommel's forces became dangerously overextended, but the Afrika Korps eventually regained the momentum. Rommel at last captured Tobruk on June 21st and was promoted to Field Marshall by Hitler. Once again it looked like Egypt would fall. After a long exhausting campaign, the British were now further back than where they had first started. And, worse, panic had set in. Roads were jammed with retreating men and machinery. Had it not been for British air superiority, Rommel, some believe, would have inflicted major losses on the fleeing columns and might have swept into Alexandria and Cairo. As part of a desperate rear-guard action, should the order for evacuation come, Maskelyne's Gang were now ordered to prepare booby traps , set up dummy pillboxes, conceal genuine gun positions, and create ambushes to confuse and trap the enemy : "Real mines were disguised as camel dung or broken car parts or common street debris, while harmless replicas of real mines were produced in quantity to be strewn about the streets. High explosives were packed inside dead rats..." (The War Magician, p.259) In retrospect, the situation was not as critical as it seemed. In artillery, tanks, fighting soldiers and aircraft, the British had clear numerical superiority. These advantages , combined with ample fuel, ammunition and food supplies, meant that overwhelming 'brute force' was now on their side. In contrast, Rommel, who appeared invincible and unstoppable, was facing a prolonged logistical nightmare. The British Eighth Army, battered, somewhat demoralised, but definitely not beaten, withdrew to a nothingness on a barren map — El Alamein, 60 miles west of Alexandria. El Alamein was, in fact, an excellent defensive position. Immediately south lay the Qattara depression, a sunken sea of sand. This time, Rommel's tanks would not be able to outflank the British. Any battle would have to be fought head-on. In the crucial month of July, 1942 , the British held their ground, repelling Rommel's attacks. In August, Churchill, frustrated by the recent setbacks, appointed Montgomery commander of the Eighth Army. Barkas was given orders to create two phantom divisions north of Cairo to dissuade Rommel from mounting a further attack. Fisher's claim that Maskelyne was involved in this operation (codenamed Sentinel) is plausible. The official historian , Michael Howard, also confirms the implementation of this deception plan which involved two notional ( ie non-existent, in name only) divisions. According to Howard "the inflated strength of the British forces was accepted by German intelligence, but this had no effect on Rommel's plans. He attacked as soon as he had enough fuel to do so, on 31 August." Eighth Army Intelligence also set in motion an unusual map scam operation. Fisher briefly mentions this deception but does not provide sufficient detail. In the book "Trojan Horses", recent recollections by Sir David Hunt , at the time a senior intelligence colonel, has shed further light on this peculiar ploy which was codenamed 'Going Ruse'. The British were in the habit of sensibly colour coding their desert maps to indicate how easy or difficult the crossing might be. The ground could vary from impassable, to slow, to acceptable, to good. As an indication of how troublesome desert terrain was, even the desig-nation 'good' meant a forward speed of only 10 m.p.h. Montgomery's main intelligence officer, de Giungand, concerned that Rommel might approach from an advantageous route, concocted a fake map, indicating good going along a particular line, and marking the alternative route further east as bad going. An incident was then fabricated to place the dud map in enemy hands. A British reconaissance patrol deliberately provoked a shooting match and then hastily withdrew, accidentally-on-purpose abandoning an armoured car. Planted on board with several genuine documents was the fake map. In the important battle of Alam Halfa, the Axis troops followed the direct route as hoped and were ambushed by British tanks and artillery concealed on a ridge. However, can we be sure that the Germans were taken in by the map? Some historians have argued that Rommel was so short of petrol that he was obliged to choose the direct route for logistical reasons. Hunt recently revealed that he personally questioned the high ranking von Thoma, captured after Alamein. Thoma confirmed that the Afrika Korps had frequently made use of the superior British maps. He actually mentioned how his colleagues had once come across an abandoned map that showed the terrain around Alam Halfa. He then explained how the German command had altered their approach route as a result. Hunt did not enlighten his distinguished prisoner any further. If Hunt's recollections of his chat with Thoma are accurate, the revised verdict supports the view that the Germans were indeed fooled. After his defeat at Alam Halfa, Rommel 'had stretched his elastic' * to the maximum and was forced to pull back. * this expression was quoted by Ellis in "Brute Force" and attributed to Fuller. In the next article, probably the most important one in the series , we shall critically examine the sophisticated deception plan drawn up for the famous battle of El Alamein.
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