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Part Thirteen
"Maskelyne's greatest illusion." Fisher's description of the El Alamein deception plan.
In the previous article, I argued that there was no firm evidence that Maskelyne was personally involved in the creation of 'Bertram', the deception plan preceding El Alamein. I would like to add the following comments. Fisher's embellished account, which exaggerated Maskelyne's role, might have been prompted by a corrupted source: Anthony Cave-Brown's best-selling "Bodyguard of Lies", published in l976. Cave-Brown attributes the following words to de Guingand, Montgomery's Chief of Staff : "Well, there it is. You must conceal 150,000 men with a thousand guns and a thousand tanks on a plain as flat and as hard as a billiard table, and the Germans must not know anything about it, although they will be watching every moment, listening for every noise, charting every track. Every bloody wog will be watching you and telling the Germans what you are doing for the price of a packet of tea. You can't do it, of course, but you've bloody well got to!" This reconstructed quotation is probably drawn from Cave-Brown's own personal interview with de Guingand. Fisher extracts this exact quote and transfers it to "The War Magician". The next paragraph from Cave-Brown's book is of interest : "Clarke conferred with Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Barkas, a film set designer* , and Major Jasper Maskeleyne, a conjuror, his two main camouflage experts. Within two hours, working at an ancient and gritty typewriter in the third-class waiting room of the Alamein railroad station, they arrived at a plan..." "...Barkas prepared what would become one of history's remarkable conjuring tricks." (*Actually, Barkas was a documentary film maker not a film-set designer.) I suspect that Fisher took advantage of this brief reference when he decided to 'construct' the climax of "The War Magician". What better way to end his book than to highlight Maskelyne's pivotal role in Operation Bertram ? Fisher sacrificed historical accuracy for the sake of dramatic impact. My own theory is that Cave-Brown's mistaken reference to Maskelyne is a product of compounded sources. Cave-Brown has carelessly fused together two separate pieces of information, i.e., 1) Barkas and Maskelyne were "camouflage experts" and 2) Barkas helped develop the deception plan for El Alamein on an "ancient and gritty typewriter". Cave-Brown has borrowed Barkas' very adjectives. It is highly likely then that Cave-Brown's source is none other than the earlier Barkas book (see Part Twelve which compares Barkas' account with Fisher's). These two historically valid assertions are then combined to produce a hybrid but invalid claim that Maskelyne was present at the crucial embryonic stage of Operation Bertram. As we saw in last month's article, it was the camouflage expert Ayrton who seems to have accompanied Barkas to the important briefing and who subsequently worked together on the deception plan. There is no firsthand evidence confirming Maskelyne's appearance. Significantly, Sykes' own memoirs, "Deceivers Ever", includes the text of a letter sent to him (in Baghdad) by Barkas on November 11th, 1942 , the week after Montgomery's victory at El Alamein. In this letter, Barkas wrote:"Early in September I was sent for by the Director of Military Operations and then passed on to BGS (Brigadier de Guingand) of Eighth Army. I was told as much about the Intention as I needed to know and was asked to submit an Appreciation and general proposals. They told me about concentration areas and enough about scale, about periods involved, about axis tracks, about the main Cover Plan activities other than camouflage, and so on. I was asked what Camouflage could do and what it could not do — in short I was asked to produce a plan. You can imagine my delight. This was what we had all been working for... At first the security aspect was so fierce that I was not allowed to discuss anything even with Ayrton but naturally he had to come in a few days later... The BGS approved the Cam appreciation and Plan and turned the whole thing over to the BI (Planning) — Richardson — who amplified it a great deal to fit in with all the other major considerations, whether of the real Plan or the Cover Plan, which he knew and I didn't. Within a few days Ayrton and I had been given a complete set of Camouflage Operational Tasks based on the agreed appreciation but now built in firmly with all the rest of the plan. We had a timetable, we knew just what we had to do and where it had to be done — and so we were able to crack on with manufacture and detailed arrangements of every kind..." Barkas was particularly appreciative of Ayrton's contribution: "Ayrton ran by far the biggest amd most varied part of the show well up forward — and we down here took over a big dummy scheme just behind." And later, towards the end of his letter, Barkas writes: "Ayrton did outstandingly well." This source — which, in my opinion, has unique authority because it was written so soon after the event — makes no mention of Maskelyne's involvement , and is consistent with my own theory that Maskelyne was not involved in the creation of Plan Bertram. Richardson, by the way, has his own chapter in "Trojan Horses" in which he outlines the Alamein deception plan : "I was a bit of an odd-job man in Plans , so I was rather surprised when Freddie de Guingand said, "Charles, get out a deception plan for Alamein..." His description tallies with much of the material we discussed in last month's article. Montgomery, in his own memoirs, confirmed Richardson's important role:"The co-ordinating brain behind this part of the plan was Charles Richardson." Obviously, many people contributed to the execution of the deception plan at El Alamein and it is highly likely that Maskelyne was one of the camoufleurs actively involved in the elaborate camouflage preparations. Fisher quotes a letter that Maskelyne sends to his wife, "Mary" (her first name was actually Evelyn) : " We are engaged in preparations for the final battle. What a wondrous show it will be. There appears to be a real need for my services this time, and I am extremely busy..." This could be based on an authentic quotation. However, it does appear that Fisher has inflated Maskelyne's role. It should be emphasised again that Ayrton's part was far more significant and deserves greater acknowledgement . According to Sykes' memoirs, Ayrton was to die during the war in tragic wasteful circumstances, contracting fatal meningitis . __________________________________________________________________________
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Sunshield used at Alamein | ||||||
___________________________________________________________________________ Fisher also gives details of a fake amphibian assault organised by the Magic Gang behind enemy lines during the initial phase of the main battle of El Alamein. This escapade is not mentioned in "Magic - Top Secret ", a curious omission as this book gives examples of sonic deception used by the Allies during their landings in southern Italy later in the war. Two questions may be asked : Is there any independent evidence to confirm the existence of this decoy sea assault? If so, is there evidence that Maskelyne was personally involved? At first, I was inclined to dismiss this episode as yet another fictional invention of Fisher's. However, intriguing independent evidence suggests that an operation of this type might have been performed. For example, Alexander McKee, in his recent book, "El Alamein — Ultra and the Three Battles" includes the following reminiscence by F.Goldsmith who served on a destroyer stationed in Alexandria. "Around midday (October 23rd) ", writes McKee, "orders were received to raise steam and proceed to sea late that afternoon. Still nothing out of the ordinary, probably a run down the coast to bombard Mersa Matruh. Goldsmith then continues :"When the ship was slowly making for the entrance to Alexandria harbour, four or five landing craft followed us in line ahead, turning to port when outside. This was a different operation to norm and interest was aroused. Were we to invade some small port or take some soldiers from the beach? The latter seemed more likely when it was realised that the landing craft were empty. But there was something strange, as there was no urgency and we were in sight of the shore for all to see..." When night fell, Goldsmith witnessed the massive surprise barrage that heralded the beginning of the battle of El Alamein: "How anyone survived that onslaught I really don't know. We returned to Alexandria with our dummy invasion fleet and were given to understand that this small exercise kept a German division on the coast. Come to think of it, if by this they evaded the awesome bombardment it also did them a good turn." A recent biography by David Fraser claims that Rommel "presumed that any frontal attack would be accompanied by landings from the sea, and gave orders about early counterattack and the deployment of troops with heavy weapons to engage the beaches instantly — orders which, again, foreshadowed the battles of Normandy." Hinsley's recent "Official History" also states that the 90th Light Division was placed"15 miles west of El Alamein"..."guarding against a seaborne landing." Fraser records that Rommel was "momentarily distracted" on receiving a signal that a large enemy force had landed by sea '"somewhere behind the front". This information, of course, turned out to be false. This rumour originated c. November 2nd, during Operation Supercharge, not during Operation Lightfoot (the first land engagement launched on October 23rd). Unfortunately, Fraser does not indicate his source for this information. There is clear evidence, then, that the Germans were worried about the threat of a seaborne landing behind their lines, and there is supporting evidence that the British did prepare deception operations to exploit this fear. However, I have strong doubts as to the authenticity of Fisher's account of a decoy naval operation. Arguably, Fisher has taken advantage of another questionable paragraph from Cave-Brown's book: "..motor torpedo boats were racing back and forth along the shore laying down a smoke screen, and from the smoke screen — so the coast-watchers (German) reported — were coming the sounds of what seemed to be a major amphibious attack: the noise and smell of engines, the rattling of anchor chains, the voices of men shouting over loud-hailers, a shower of flares to illuminate the beaches. Stumme reacted immediately; he ordered bombers and fighters into the air and directed the 90th Light's reserve regiment to the area to repulse what appeared to be an attempt to land behind the German line. Artillery and tanks began to rake the sea with fire; but when the smoke screen finally lifted, all that was visible were a few rafts bobbing on the sea. It had been a feint; the British had unveiled a new weapon in their armoury of special means — sonic and nasal deception. The noises of battle had come from recordings played over sound amplifiers brought in close to the beaches by the MTB's. The flares had been fired into the air automatically; the smell of engines had come from canisters on rafts... Stumme had been tricked into sending an important segment of one of his best divisions out of the main battle." When I compared this account to Fisher's version ("The War Magician", p. 294-5), I again began to suspect that Fisher had conveniently inserted Maskelyne and his Magic Gang into these alleged exploits in order to maximise the narrative impact. On the available evidence, I would suggest that a) the British probably did launch a decoy operation on a modest scale, b) Maskelyne might have been directly involved, but such a claim remains unproven, and c) this minor episode had little effect on Stumme's appreciation of the unfolding battle. Similar criticisms could be made against the authenticity of Maskelyne's Magic Mirror escapade during Operation Supercharge, the important breakthrough in the second phase of El Alamein. Maskelyne and his Gang allegedly confuse and impede the advance of eight German tanks by simulating the formidable presence of equivalent British tanks and support vehicles. This dubious episode has been elaborated further in other books. For example, the author (or ghost-writer?) of "The Secret War of Charles Fraser-Smith" mistakenly writes:" In one special case with the help of mirrors he (Maskelyne) conjured up thirty six tanks in the desert where in fact there was only one." In the next article, we will discuss Maskelyne's war career after El Alamein — in as far as it can be reconstructed.
MASKELYNE & FAIRBANKS Jnr. Interestingly, Douglas Fairbanks Jnr. in "Trojan Horses" briefly refers to a decoy naval operation: "Montgomery at El Alamein had some success with that (sonic deception) at sea when he simulated an amphibious landing, which threw the German Commander, General Stumme, into a bit of panic." Fairbanks' source might well have been Maskelyne himself. Douglas Fairbanks Jnr. became acquainted with Jasper Maskelyne during the war. "Magic-Top Secret" includes a photograph of the two men together in uniform. Fairbanks, reminiscing about his visits to the Middle East, wrote: "At one time or another I came across David Strangeways, David Hunt, and the conjuror Jasper Maskleyne, they were all involved, in one way or another, with Dudley Clarke, who really gave a lead to the whole thing." Surprisingly, Fisher's "The War Magician" does not explore this connection. This is probably because the narrative comes to an end immediately after El Alamein in November 1942. Fairbanks should not be discounted as a decorative Hollywood mascot employed merely for propaganda purposes. After completing a dangerous stint on convoy protection, Fairbanks made use of his personal contacts with Mountbatten and worked as a liaison man between the American Navy and deception outfits in the British armed forces. One of his first jobs was to assess the effectiveness of sonic deception in naval landings. Later, in league with the British, he was involved (c. 1943) in setting up special amphibian raiding forces in the Mediterranean. He also proved valuable in recruiting students from American universities who showed expertise in electronics. In his 1993 autobiography, A Hell of a War, Fairbanks Jnr. makes two references to Jasper Maskelyne: In 1942 Fairbanks was stationed in Scotland. "Our particular quarters were at the supposedly haunted Achnocarry Castle, near the even more secret base for deception development at Ballantrae...Although the ideas for deception equipment and diversionary planning originated with the Eighth Army in Egypt and evolved further at Richmoind Terrace Headquarters, it was Ballantrae that most of the actual experiments with visual tactical ruses and camouflage devices were carried out. Other wicked tricks, including all manner of booby traps (some designed inside most convincing horse and camel pats) were developed in an Egyptian base outside Cairo under the supervision of Major Jasper Maskelyne, in peacetime a prominent member of a famous family of professional magicians. In September, 1943, Fairbanks spent a week in Cairo. "I, for my part, spent a day visiting Major Jasper Maskelyne's "dirty-tricks factory"at the Abbasssia Experimental Station, went sightseeing, and drank at the exclusive Mohammed Ali Club..., and with Prince Aly Khan at the Gazine Sporting Club." Alistair Maskelyne made the following comment in his first letter : "I can vouch for Douglas Fairbanks Jnr., he was at one time a partner with my father in some forms of evasion and escape. Later in the war, when my mother had returned to England to combat the illness which was to be diagnosed as terminal cancer, she had lunch with Fairbanks at the Savoy Hotel. It was one of the big events of her life." | ||||||
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