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Final
"Myth is invulnerable to mere facts." Roland Barthes
"We are gluttons for false facts; our craving for fraud rejects all truth but the look of it." David Lowenthal in Fake? The Art of Deception
This final article of the series allows me to revise and, where necessary, correct information or assessments presented in previous episodes. Note: Any quotations in bold italics are my own words extracted from the original articles. Article One " Booth speculated that perhaps Fisher's book could not be so easily published in England because of legal restrictions such as the Official Secrets Act. " • As Brian McCullagh correctly points out, "The War Magician" was given an English pub-lication. Corgi Books brought out a paperback version. "Maskelyne's mythical status as a clandestine war wizard needs to be critically reviewed." • To my dismay, "Magic-Top Secret" , though long out of print, has been given favourable and uncritical citations by Michael Howard in "Strategic Deception in the Second World War'"(1990), and, more recently, by M.R.D. Foot in the massive scholarly compendium, "'The Oxford Companion to the Second World War " (1995). In contrast, this series , though mindful of the many uses of deception in warfare, has tried to critically analyse Makelyne's fabled achievements. • My comments on 'pathography' , the writing of critical biography, remain relevant. Alistair Maskelyne's words on "Magic Top Secret" : When I was given a preliminary draft to read in 1946 my comment to father was "there is so much overdramatised fiction here that it is obviously untrue. Can we get it rewritten to present your wartime feats on the lines of a serving officer?" The ghost writer's reply: "there were thousands such. It would never sell". In the event , the book sold about five copies, and a copy requested by TIME was returned unreviewed. It was too poorly written and too much embroidered to sell. This was the book stumbled upon by Fisher some thirty years later and made up as the "War Magician", with the aid of my father's diaries he borrowed but never returned from my Uncle Noel and his wife Joan. • Alistair Maskelyne's view that "Magic-Top Secret" is "a load of rubbish" is perhaps too harsh. The book does have some interesting sections and contains useful photographs. Magic - Top Secret may well be inaccurate and misleading and may be the imaginative product of Jasper and his ghost-writer but I would not want to dismiss the whole book as fictitious nonsense. At the very least, it enables me to compare 'incidents' in both texts and check for significant discrepancies, omissions and contradictions. • Professor Dawes mentioned "Magic Top-Secret" went into a second printing. This would surely indicate that the book eventually sold adequately. • Stephen Sykes own account "Deceivers Ever — Memoirs of a Camouflage Officer", published in 1990, is a good example of a sober, unembroidered recollection by a serving officer. This is the kind of memoir that Alistair Maskelyne might have wanted his father to produce. • Brian McCullagh says he received a letter from Maskelyne authority John Salisse claiming that Fisher had also taken material from his own collection and had not returned the borrowed items. "Even if the War Magician is an untenable hybrid of truth and fiction, it will be argued that the more plausible elements are worthy of attention. Separating the truth from the fantasy is a daunting task. The information is contaminated and distorted. And yet there are genuine accomplishments buried beneath the sand of exaggeration and fabrication." • Yes, over this series I have tried to disentangle truth from fantasy. Jasper Maskelyne's wartime record is unfortunately so distorted and so contaminated that his actual accomplishments, buried deep in the sand, are very hard to reconstruct.
Article Three "It will be argued that strategic and tactical deception enabled the Allies to end the war sooner and with less casualties, but that the final outcome was based on the hard logistics of total war. " • This article introduced the 'brute force' model of warfare. This digression is actually of great relevance to the overall series. I hope that readers who have carefully absorbed subsequent articles will now understand and appreciate the importance of this model.
Article Four "Ill-prepared and lacking the means of either launching or protecting an amphibious assault, Hitler and the German High Command made an informed and rational decision to postpone Sea Lion, the code name for the invasion. " • The recent revelation that the British were secretly prepared to use extensive gas warfare to defend their territory, reinforces the view that Sea Lion would have failed disastrously.
Article Five • "Some sceptics have dismissed the use of dummies as "a pathetic last resort of British Arms facing total disaster..." However, as the war progressed, more sophisticated dummies or decoys were introduced. Cruikshank's pioneer book on "Deception in World War Two" (1979) documents further developments. By late 1943, many different types were available: "There were wheeled dummies, which could move under their own power, or be towed; portable folding dummies, which were self-supporting when erected; portable collapsible dummies, which had to be supported by guy-ropes; ground mat dummies, simulating slit trenches; vertical screen dummies, carrying a representation of the equipment they imitated; and static dummies, which were heavy and slow to erect..." "Some of the devices were available in inflatable form. One of the most popular was the Sherman tank, which was in fact produced in three versions : folding, inflatable, and mobile." • Also David Smiley in his recent memoirs ,"Irregular Regular" (1994), describes how in March 1942 he was given command of a 'tank squadron' in the Eighth Army which comprised eighteen dummy tanks."They were in the most appalling state of repair and virtually on their last legs. The dummy tank was basically a Morris 15-cwt chassis on which had been welded a tubular metal frame , with the crude addition of three-ply wood, canvas and piping, embellished by some skilful painting. The result to anyone no nearer than 300 yards was an adequate reproduction of the A 15 tank, better known as the Crusader. Enemy aircraft , however, could see that the vehicles left wheel and not track marks in the sand. This difficulty was partly overcome by parking the dummies in the tracks of genuine tanks. When they could be spared, a couple were usually attached to us for making tracks.On the move real tanks raised far more dust than wheeled vehicles, so the dummies achieved the same effect by dragging chains behind them. Chains were also fixed to the bottom of the canvas skirting which covered the wheels and was painted to represent the bogey wheels and tracks. Once the chains got torn off - and they often did in thorn bushes - the skirts flapped in the wind." In late April 1942 , Smiley returned to Cairo to take charge of fresh dummies. "This time they represented the American General Grant tank that had now made its appearance in the Eighth Army. These dummies were so secret that before we left Cairo they were all covered with sacking so that nobody could see what was underneath." Smiley's formation of dummy tanks was attacked on two separate occasions by German and Italian fighters. His closest brush with death, though, was not from enemy fire. A crate of plastic explosives, normally kept in reserve to mimic the sound of tank fire, accidentally detonated and blew up his command truck. • The Germans faced similar camouflage problems. Their tanks, designed for a European war, were also the wrong colour. According to Behrendt:"in the barren desert battlefields...camouflage against aircraft was almost impossible. The only protection lay in dispersing the vehicles...The lesson of keeping three, four or five hundred yards between each vehicle was quickly learned. The German tanks...being painted in field-grey were clearly visible; but the soldiers soon found ways and means of 'painting' their vehicles temporarily; one method was to strew sand on ' oiled' vehicles."
Article Six • This effectively destroys two of the central myths of "The War Magician", namely the protection of Alexandria and the alleged vanishing of the Suez Canal. I was fortunate to stumble across S. Morewood's fine article,"Protecting the Jugular Vein of Empire". Article Seven • After completing this, I discovered that Donald McCormick, a connoisseur of espionage fiction and a biographer of Ian Fleming, has also made the link between Fraser-Smith and the fictional 'Q' branch: "As to the brains behind 'Q-Branch', this was unquestionably Charles Fraser-Smith..." According to McCormick, the name of the fictional character 'Major Boothroyd' was taken from Geoffrey Boothroyd, an expert in firearms, who frequently volunteered technical advice to Fleming.
Article Nine M.R.D. Foot's "SOE 1940-46" (1984) contains additional information on clandestine devices. He also discloses the name of another eccentric genius, Jefferis, whose secret workshop was based in a country mansion near Aylesbury: "There Jefferis spent most of the war, making inventions at an average rate of about one a week, trying them out in the adjoining paddocks and ponds, and passing on those that worked properly either to SOE or to the rest of the armed forces."
Article Ten "a sideshow" • The North African campaign can certainly be seen as a sideshow in terms of the land forces involved. Rommel usually commanded only four to five divisions, while in Russia the Germans were deploying over 160 divisions. However, it would be wrong to dismiss the campaign as irrelevant or minor. Ellis points out that the Mediterranean conflict diverted nearly 20% of the strength of the Luftwaffe. "Military historians...emphasize how unfamiliar Rommel and his men were with desert warfare when they first arrived in Africa." • Recently, I came across an account of the desert war written from the German viewpoint by Hans-Otto Behrendt , who served as a liaison officer with Rommel. Behrendt confirms this lack of preparation :"The truth was that the German soldiers, although they had been medically examined for tropical fitness, arrived in the North African desert comparatively unprepared...How envious the Germans were of the British prisoners-of-war who appeared to be so desert-trained and healthy!" "According to Fisher, Maskelyne finished the dummy battleship in February, 1942, and named it H.M.S. Houdin in honour of the great French magician Robert-Houdin. " • Michael Howard's appendix on Naval Deception refers to Britain's use of another dummy battleship in 1942. "So convincing was her appearance that in June, 1942, sailing with a convoy to the relief of Malta, she attracted heavy attacks by enemy bombers. Her active career ended ignominiously when a monsoon in the Indian Ocean swept overboard one of her dummy turrets..."
Article Eleven • Behrendt reveals that Rommel in 1941, at the start of his campaign, used the following simple trick to deceive the enemy into overestimating his troop concentrations. German soldiers would erect "tents which contained only one man instead of the six assumed by the British".
Article Twelve & Thirteen Together with Article Six, these are the pivotal articles in the series. They attack the central myths of '"The War Magician", as presented by Fisher, and eulogised by Booth. "In Fisher's book there is no reference to July 10th, the day on which Australian troops stormed the Afrika Korps' forward intercept station." • Behrendt gives a detailed account of the elimination of Seebohm's Radio Intercept Unit. • As for the main battle of El Alamein, Behrendt makes some interesting comments: "G-2...was convinced that an all-out attack by Eighth Army was imminent. An important indication bearing this out was that before previous operations of this kind in the Western Desert, stretcher bearers had been called for by a wireless link with the Nile Valley (Heluan) on each occasion eight days before the attack.. As just such a demand had been transmitted over the same link on 15th October it could be assumed...that the most probable date of attack would be 23rd October..." "...the thesis sometimes advanced, by German critics too, that the Panzerarmee was completely in the dark about the strength and timing of the British offensive, does not hold water. An all-out attack by Eighth Army had been widely expected any day. Air reconnaissance showed the army getting stronger by the week. The exact date was guessed fairly accurately; on the other hand, the axis of the thrust and the sectors of the attack were unknown." • This would indicate that 'Bertram', the deception plan, was partly successful in terms of the 'where' but not necessarily the 'when'. • Behrendt is a valuable source, but his recollections, made almost forty years later, may be susceptible to the wisdom of hindsight. As an intelligence operative, he would presumably be reluctant to admit his men were caught by surprise. "By 28th October (Sixth Day of Fighting) much light had been thrown on the enemy order of battle by prisoners and captured documents...Interrogations of prisoners...yielded valuable results. Especially noteworthy was...the revelation by a British soldier that this time the main thrust would not be conducted as a 'left hook' (in the south) but in the northern sector. This reinforced the C-in-C's intention of transferring 21st Panzer Division to the north; he issued the order for the transfer on 26th October at 10:20 p.m." • This additional information is consistent with the analysis of the battle over both articles. "...the decisive factor influencing victory at El Alamein was surely the incontrovertible fact that Montgomery had more men and military hardware. " • Behrendt also confirms this view when he writes about why the Germans lost at El Alamein: "The decisive factor ...was quite simply the sheer British superiority in tanks, artillery, and aircraft for which no amount of tactical skill and self-sacrifice could compensate. During this battle Ultra served only in the role of a chronicler." Article Sixteen "The massive numerical superiority in the hardware of war — the artillery, tanks, trucks, aircraft, naval vehicles and infantry reserves — combined with Secret Intelligence , was so overwhelming that it is hard to see how the Allies could have been thrown back into the sea ..." • I still hold this opinion. Nevertheless, those interested in alternative outcomes might want to read P. Tsouras' recent reconstruction , "Disaster at D-Day: The Germans Defeat the Allies, June 1944." Rommel defeats the American invaders on Omaha Beach and turns the tide. • Jane Bethell, a secretary in military intelligence, recalls the tension during the operation:" It might have been much, much worse, with much stiffer opposition and many more casualties. You even had to consider the worst possible thing, that we might have been pushed back into the sea." • "...the fake oil installation at Dover...Most sources credit Basil Spence as the architect of this scheme." William Breuer, author of "Hoodwinking Hitler, The Normandy Deception", also credits Spence:"Near Dover, nearly three miles of the Channel shoreline was cleared as a site for a huge oil storage depot...But nowhere was there a drop of oil. Basil Spence, a creative professor of architecture at Britain's Royal Academy, had designed this make-believe facility." However, this may be another case of misattribution. When Sykes met Basil Spence in March 1944, he seemed frustrated with his job as a camouflage officer. "We had lunch together and he told me that he was hating his job at Sub-Area — he had no freedom to do camouflage and felt only a stooge." Was Spence's role somewhat akin to Maskelyne's notional role in A-force? Were they employed as internal pawns for obscure bureaucratic purposes ? Article Eighteen "Modern scholarship tends to emphasise the 'inevitability' of the Allied victory. This revised approach appears to be at variance with earlier, populist accounts of the war which saw the outcome as uncertain and precariously balanced. " • R. Parker's "Struggle for Survival" (1989) reflects this new orthodoxy:"Superior resources won the war: the victors had greater numbers of men and women and made more weapons. In population and in industrial capacity, the allies, even after losing France, were stronger than the axis powers." • An exception is Richard Overy's timely new book, "Why the Allies Won" (1995). This attacks the brute force model, or at least the cruder versions of it. Here are some relevant quotations: "Battles are not pre-ordained. If they were, no one would bother to fight them." "...no rational man in early 1942 would have guessed at the eventual outcome of the war." "Though from today's perspective Allied victory might seem somehow inevitable, the conflict was poised on a knife-edge in the middle years of the war." "Fighting power owed something in the long run to the large surplus of weapons available to the Allies, though in the critical battles of 1942 and 1943 that surplus was not as large as it became in 1944 and 1945 when Axis defeat was more certain." "It was in 1942-1943 that the disparity between the two sides was created by Soviet industrial revival and American rearmament. Neither could be taken for granted." I found Overy's book a useful counterbalance to John Ellis' "Brute Force", but, in my opinion, it does not quite dislodge the relentless strength of Ellis' arguments. I would also add that the military scenario on the eve of El Alamein tends to challenge Overton's thesis. After all, this 'critical' battle was fought in late 1942 and the outcome, even at this earlier stage of the war, surely revealed clear Allied material superiority. This series has, in any case, proposed an intermediate model, where brute force factors are very important, but are not the sole determinants of outcome. • On the 'impossibility' of defeating Russia, see also Gerhard Weinberg's impressive and massive work, "A World at Arms (1994)". Weinberg cites Schuller's study of the supply difficulties facing the German Army as it entered deeper into enemy territory. By September 1941, the Germans "had already lost whatever chance they might theoretically have had to defeat the Soviet Union." • An important and neglected quote was a clever reversal of Churchill's famous dictum, "Truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies." Mure, in tribute to Dudley Clarke, coined the variant: "The lie - the cover plan - is so precious that it should be flanked with an escort of truths." • John Ellis' words in a previous book on the fighting soldier also impressed me :"Few areas of the Western Desert resembled the sweeping dunes of Hollywood fiction; most of it looked like a slovenly construction site - or, after the passage of the armies, like a fly-blown garbage dump." • Finally, the brilliant photograph of brave Australian troops, bayonets drawn, clambering over a ridge at El Alamein , is a classic image of combat and adorns the covers of many war books. Unfortunately, the famous photograph is a fake. These men are gallantly charging towards their own cookhouse. The battle scene was staged by the photographer Len Chetwyn. "He was using cooks, bottle washers or whoever was back at base, and staging stuff that was reckoned to be real battle material with smoke and a few bangs let off with gun cotton." Despite this embarrassing revelation, if I were to produce a book from this series, I would definitely reproduce this sham photo on the cover as an ironic tribute to wartime deception.
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